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IT’S NOTHING PERSONAL:  
WHY EXISTING STATE LAWS ON POINT-OF-
SALE CONSUMER DATA COLLECTION 
SHOULD BE REPLACED WITH A FEDERAL 
STANDARD 
KATE MIRINO† 
“Are you interested in signing up to receive exclusive offers 
and news about our products via email?”  We almost all have 
fielded some variant of this question at the check-out counters of 
the retail stores we frequent.  And it is no wonder that 
businesses continue to experiment with new methods of 
obtaining our email addresses—it has been forecasted that, by 
2019, more than 246 billion emails will be exchanged around the 
world each day.1  In 2018, the prevalence of email in our daily 
lives is already overwhelming, making it “one of the most 
profitable and effective” platforms out there for promotional 
messaging.2  From a commercial standpoint, email—“the 
lifeblood of the Internet”—allows for expansion beyond the 
traditional bounds of advertising and helps businesses penetrate 
the broader worlds of consumers.3 
Technological growth as rapid as that which has occurred in 
the digital space over the past several decades is almost certain 
to generate ambiguities across all areas of the law.  Privacy, and 
information privacy in particular, is one field in which especially 
puzzling questions have arisen.  Information privacy, as 
distinguished from decisional privacy—the focus in Roe v. Wade, 
for example—can be viewed “as the result of legal restrictions 
 
† Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2019, St. John’s University 
School of Law; B.A., 2012, Boston College. Many thanks to Professor Jeff Sovern for 
his helpful guidance on this Note. 
1 Email Statistics Report, 2015-2019, THE RADICATI GROUP, INC. 3 (2015), 
https://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Email-Statistics-Report-
2015-2019-Executive-Summary.pdf (last visited June 21, 2019). 
2 JEANNIEY MULLEN & DAVID DANIELS, EMAIL MARKETING: AN HOUR A DAY 4 
(2009). 
3 Id. at 5. 
178 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:177   
and other conditions, such as social norms, that govern the use, 
transfer, and processing of personal data.”4  In the United States, 
information privacy is a segmented body of law, made up of a 
disconnected set of sector-specific rules, which have been 
established by an unintended mix of “federal and state 
legislatures, agencies and courts, industry associations, 
individual companies, and market forces.”5  Other commentators 
similarly have described United States information privacy as 
“ad hoc,”6 “patchwork,”7 and “piecemeal,”8 the oversight of which 
has been entrusted to “a hodgepodge” of uncoordinated actors.9  
Much of today’s uncertainty in this area stems from the 
challenges those actors have faced in adapting a core principle of 
information privacy law—namely, what has been dubbed 
“personal data,”10 “personal information,”11 or “personally 
identifying information (‘PII’)”12—to contemporary life.  Because 
it is the “personal“ quality of certain types of information that 
springs consumer rights,13 a clear definition of what counts as 
“personal” is crucial to any law in this sphere.  Traditionally 
defined as “information relating to an identifiable individual,”14 
 
4 Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2055, 2058 (2004). 
5 Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and 
International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 1, 22–23 (2000). 
6 Id. at 3. 
7 Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 904 (2009). 
8 Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 
1088 (2006) (reviewing DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: PRIVACY AND 
TECHNOLOGY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004)). 
9 Shaffer, supra note 5, at 26 (identifying such “[r]esponsible agencies” as “the 
Federal Trade Commission, the Office of Consumer Affairs, the Office of 
Management and Budget, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Social 
Security Administration, the Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Reserve Board, and the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration”). “To date, these agencies do 
not coordinate their data privacy oversight.” Id. 
10 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 4, at 2058. 
11 See, e.g., Éloïse Gratton, If Personal Information is Privacy’s Gatekeeper, Then 
Risk of Harm is the Key: A Proposed Method for Determining What Counts as 
Personal Information, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 105, 110 (2014). 
12 See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Direct Marketing, Mobile Phones, and Consumer 
Privacy: Ensuring Adequate Disclosure and Consent Mechanisms for Emerging 
Mobile Advertising Practices, 60 FED. COMM. L.J. 229, 239 (2008). 
13 Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and A New 
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1824 (2011); 
see also Gratton, supra note 11, at 110. 
14 Gratton, supra note 11, at 112. 
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from a modern perspective, personal data is a much hazier 
concept, and no standard definition has been established in the 
United States.15  In today’s world, even “a few scraps” of 
anonymous data on the Internet can be enough to piece together 
someone’s identity;16 thus, as the development of technology 
continues to accelerate onward, some commentators suggest 
adherence to a definition of personal data that is more fluid and 
dependent upon continuing social advancements.17 
One subset of information privacy law that has proven 
particularly murky in modern application is that which governs 
how private entities collect the personal information of 
consumers during in-store transactions.  California’s 
Song-Beverly Credit Card Act (“Song-Beverly” or the 
“Song-Beverly Act”), for example, which was enacted in 1971 to 
bolster consumer protections against credit card fraud and 
preserve data privacy, prohibits businesses from requesting or 
requiring that a customer provide personal identification 
information during the course of a credit card transaction, 
subject to limited exceptions.18  Similar laws have been enacted in 
several other jurisdictions, and they each apply to varying 
categories of information, transactions, and conduct.19  One 
element that is consistent among them, however, is that they all 
were passed before “the advent of modern electronic payment 
methods, online transactions, downloadable products and the 
Internet,” rendering their application in today’s retail 
atmosphere uncertain.20  Judicial interpretation of these laws 
necessarily involves some gap filling, and often varies from one 
jurisdiction to the next, leaving consumers with inconsistent 
 
15 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 13, at 1816. 
16 Mark Bartholomew, Intellectual Property’s Lessons for Information Privacy, 
92 NEB. L. REV. 746, 747–48 (2014). 
17 See, e.g., Schwartz & Solove, supra note 13, at 1818. 
18 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(a) (West 2018). 
19 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 105 (West 2018); see also D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 47-3153 (West 2018); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 520-a (McKinney 2018); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 50-669a (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-317 (West 2018); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:11-17 (West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.214 (West 
2018); 69 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602 (West 2018); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 6-13-16 (West 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.401 (West 2018). 
20 Amy P. Lally & Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Today’s Retailers are Fighting 
Yesterday’s Privacy Laws, LAW 360 (June 27, 2014, 11:21 AM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/552220/today-s-retailers-are-fighting-yesterday-s-
privacy-laws. 
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safeguards and businesses with scant guidance on how to 
maintain compliant practices.21 
Accordingly, this Note proposes a contemporary-minded 
federal solution to preempt and standardize the various, 
outmoded state approaches in this field.  Part I engages in a 
historical overview of the development of information privacy law 
in the United States.  Part II provides a summary and 
comparison of the existing state rules at play.  Part III discusses 
the negative consequences—both to consumers and to 
businesses—of inconsistent regulation in this area, and explains 
why a federal solution is necessary.  Part IV outlines the 
parameters of the federal regulation proposed by this Note. 
I. THE HISTORY OF INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW IN THE  
UNITED STATES 
Dating as far back as the colonial era, the common law 
always protected “against eavesdropping” in the United States.22  
Later on, the passage of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution reflected the 
intent of the framers to exclude the government from certain 
private realms of the people:23 the Third Amendment limits the 
government’s freedom to quarter soldiers in private homes;24 the 
Fourth Amendment protects the “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects” of individuals from “unreasonable searches and 
seizures”;25 and the Fifth Amendment provides that no “private 
property [shall] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”26 
The United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to 
explore information privacy law concepts as early as 1877, when 
it held that sealed letters and packages in the mail, as opposed to 
newspapers, magazines, and other items intentionally left open 
to inspection, could be “opened and examined only 
under . . . warrant.”27  The Court recognized that those rights of 
 
21 See id. 
22 Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, PROSKAUER ON 
PRIVACY 1–4 (2006), https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer= 
https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=2076&context=faculty_publications. 
23 Id. at 1-5. 
24 U.S. CONST. amend. III. 
25 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
27 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877); see also Solove, supra note 22,  
at 1–7. 
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individuals—whatever their precise definition or scope—were “of 
far greater importance than the transportation of the mail.”28  
And in the spirit of the Fourth Amendment, the Court noted that 
“[n]o law of Congress [could] place in the hands of [postal] 
officials . . . any authority to invade the secrecy of letters 
and . . . sealed packages in the mail.”29 
With the advent of telegraphic messages as a mode of 
communication technology, courts and legislators grappled with 
how to regulate them.30  Tort privacy, as discussed by Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis in their celebrated Harvard Law 
Review article, The Right to Privacy,31 had some influence on 
early perceptions of information privacy law.32  Even in simpler 
times, Warren and Brandeis recognized that the evolution of 
society and technology will require continual endorsement of new 
rights,33 and they cited the intricacies of modern life as “hav[ing] 
rendered necessary some retreat from the world.”34  Reviewing 
thoroughly a person’s right to decide whether and how 
extensively his feelings or thoughts could be made public, the 
commentators also mused, in a broader sense, that an individual 
must be able to control public access to “that which is his,”35 to 
elect “to be let alone,”36 and to enjoy “the right to [his] 
personality.”37 
Whereas the currency of personal information in the 
nineteenth century was rooted largely in its role in the exchange 
of gossip,38 personal information has, in later years, come to 
harbor more substantial, sophisticated sources of value.  Through 
the 1960s and 1970s, digital recordkeeping systems and data 
analysis methods began to facilitate unprecedented means of 
 
28 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 732; see also Solove, supra note 22, at 1-7. 
29 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733; see also Solove, supra note 22, at 1-7. 
30 See, e.g., Ex parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 90–91 (1880) (“[t]elegraphic messages 
are . . . of recent origin, and, therefore, the common law furnishes nothing but 
analogies for our guide.”); see also Solove, supra note 22, at 1-7. 
31 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890); see also Schwartz, supra note 7, at 907 (“Tort privacy’s centrality to 
the law of information privacy has also waned over time.”). 
32 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 907. 
33 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 31, at 193. 
34 Id. at 196. 
35 Id. at 199 (emphasis added). 
36 Id. at 205. 
37 Id. at 207 (emphasis added). 
38 Id. at 196. 
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identifying individuals from their personal information.39  As a 
result, the concept of privacy law in the United States was finally 
expanded to include clear control over one’s personal data.  In 
1984, Congress enacted the Cable Communications Policy Act, 
and made a significant breakthrough in “not only refer[ring] to 
PII, but also mak[ing] PII the trigger for the applicability of the 
law.”40 
The law’s means of protecting individual control over one’s 
personal data developed as “Fair Information Practices” (or 
“FIPs”)—certain duties on processers of personal information 
that revolve around the following principles: 
(1) limits on information use; (2) limits on data collection, also 
termed data minimization; (3) limits on disclosure of personal 
information; (4) collection and use only of information that is 
accurate, relevant, and up-to-date (data quality principle); 
(5) notice, access, and correction rights for the individual; (6) the 
creation of processing systems that the concerned individual can 
understand (transparent processing systems); and (7) security 
for personal data.41 
United States privacy law enforces FIPs through different 
sets of rules for public and private actors,42 and in the private 
realm, unlike the omnibus regimes at play in other countries, 
rules in the United States are generally sector-specific.43  Some 
observers opine that this evolutionary path has been the result of 
legislative “react[ion] to public scandals,” and not of a proactive 
commitment to comprehensive privacy protection.44  The 
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and 
Marketing Act (“CAN-SPAM” or the “CAN-SPAM Act”), for 
example, governs email, specifically.45  It identified as 
problematic the “rapid growth in the volume of unsolicited 
commercial [email]” received by consumers,46 and noted that 
inconsistent state laws on the matter made it difficult for 
businesses to comply with all applicable standards.47  
 
39 See Gratton, supra note 11, at 110; see also Schwartz & Solove, supra note 13, 
at 1821. Before computers, to link data to a person, the data would almost always 
need to contain the person’s name or likeness. Id. 
40 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2012); Schwartz & Solove, supra note 13, at 1824. 
41 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 907–08. 
42 See Shaffer, supra note 5, at 24. 
43 See Richards, supra note 8, at 1088. 
44 Shaffer, supra note 5, at 25. 
45 See 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2012). 
46 § 7701(a)(2). 
47 See § 7701(a)(11). 
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CAN-SPAM’s response to the dilemma was a nationwide 
regulatory scheme prohibiting private entities from, among other 
things, gathering consumer email addresses “through improper 
means” or sending false or misleading information to consumers 
via email.48 
California’s Song-Beverly Act and other state laws in the 
point-of-sale data collection field all are focused on one very 
specific zone of conduct: the requesting and recording of 
consumers’ personal data by merchants at the time of sale.  The 
laws differ, however, in important respects, both textually and as 
judicially interpreted and applied.  Thus, motives similar to the 
driving forces behind CAN-SPAM warrant a standardized, 
federal solution. 
II. CALIFORNIA’S SONG-BEVERLY ACT AND OTHER  
STATE LAWS AT PLAY 
Over a dozen United States jurisdictions have laws that 
restrict how commercial entities may collect the personal data of 
consumers at the point of sale.49  In general, the laws prohibit 
businesses from requiring a customer to provide certain types of 
personal information as a condition to accepting the customer’s 
credit card as payment.50  Aside from this basic unifying premise, 
the laws vary significantly.  The exceptions they itemize, for 
 
48 15 U.S.C. §§ 7703(b)(2)(A)(i), 7704(a)(1) (2012). Other examples of federal, 
sector-specific information privacy laws include: the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act (“COPPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 6502 (2012), which governs how entities 
collect personal information from children online; the Financial Services 
Modernization Act (the “Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2012), 
which governs how financial institutions collect and protect the personal information 
of consumers; and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012) et seq., which governs how entities collect 
consumer health information. 
49 See Lally & Valerio Barrad, supra note 20. 
50 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(a)(2) (West 2018); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 50-669a(a) (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 105(a) (West 2018); N.Y. 
GEN. BUS. LAW § 520-a(3) (McKinney 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:11-17 (West 2018); 
69 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602(a) (West 2018); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§ 6-13-16(a) (West 2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.401(1) (West 2018); D.C. Code Ann. 
§ 47-3153(a) (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-317(a) (West 2018). In 
Oregon, while a business may require a credit or debit card holder to provide 
personal information, it may not record that information on a transaction form. See 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.214(1) (West 2018). In California and the District of 
Columbia, businesses may neither require nor request that a credit card holder 
provide certain personal information as a condition to accepting the credit card. See 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(a)(2); D.C. Code Ann. § 47-3153(a). 
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example, are inconsistent.51  Many designate “special purpose[s],” 
such as shipping, warranty, delivery, servicing, installation, or 
special orders, for which a business may request and record a 
customer’s personal information.52  Others permit a business to 
collect a customer’s personal information if the business’s credit 
card issuers will not complete the credit card transaction without 
it,53 or if federal or state laws or contractual obligations require 
the business to collect it.54  Still others have carved out 
exceptions for businesses that process credit card transactions by 
mailing settlement forms to designated bankcard centers,55 and 
for various other sets of circumstances.56 
Perhaps the most troublesome discrepancy among these 
statutes, however, is their lack of alignment on a clear 
understanding of what counts as personal identification 
information—the type of data springing each law’s applicability 
to consumer transactions.  The varying definitions that have 
 
51 See Lally & Valerio Barrad, supra note 20. 
52 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(c) (West 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-669a(c) 
(West 2018); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 520-a(3) (McKinney 2018); 69 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602(a) (West 2018); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13-16(b) (West 
2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.401(2) (West 2018); see also D.C. Code Ann. § 47-
3153(b) (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-317(b) (West 2018). New 
Jersey has no such “special purpose” exception. Massachusetts and Oregon do, so 
long as the customer provides the information for one of the enumerated special 
purposes voluntarily. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 105(a) (West 2018); OR. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.214(2) (West 2018). 
53 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-669a(c) (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, 
§ 105(a) (West 2018); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 520-a(3) (McKinney 2018); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 56:11-17 (West 2018); 69 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602(a) (West 
2018); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13-16(a) (West 2018). 
54 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(c)(3)(A), (C) (West 2018); 69 PA. STAT. AND CONS. 
STAT. ANN.  § 2602(a)(3) (West 2018). 
55 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-317(b)(3) (West 2018); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW 
§ 520-a(3) (McKinney 2018); 69 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602(a)(2) (West 
2018); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13-16(b) (West 2018). 
56 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(c)(1) (West 2018) (permitting businesses to 
collect personal information in connection with cash advance transactions, and 
permitting motor fuel retailers to collect ZIP codes solely to prevent fraud, theft, or 
identify theft); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 105(c)(1) (West 2018) (permitting 
businesses to collect credit card information where the card serves as a deposit to 
ensure payment if default, loss, or another similar event occurs); see also MD. CODE 
ANN., COM. LAW § 13-317(b)(2) (West 2018) (permitting businesses to collect 
personal information where the credit card issuer’s authorization with respect to the 
customer’s available credit is unnecessary to conclude the transaction); 6 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 6-13-16(b), (c) (permitting businesses to collect personal information if 
the customer provides it pursuant to the business’s request, or where the credit card 
issuer must provide authorization as to the availability of credit to conclude the 
transaction); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.401(2)(a) (West 2018). 
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been adopted for this term are discussed categorically below and 
provide a useful backdrop to the problems identified by this Note. 
A. Expansive Definitions of Personal Identification Information 
The farthest reaching state statutory definitions of “personal 
identification information” appear in California’s Song-Beverly 
Act57 and in Kansas’s state statute.58  These laws define “personal 
identification information” as “information concerning the 
cardholder, other than information set forth on the credit card, 
and including, but not limited to, the cardholder’s address and 
telephone number.”59 
In California, the imprecision of this definition coupled with 
the complexities of modern retail environments have required a 
certain level of judicial extrapolation to set the exact parameters 
of this term.60  In Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., for 
example, the California Supreme Court focused on the broad 
reach of the word “concerning” in holding that a customer’s ZIP 
code qualified as “personal identification information” under the 
Song-Beverly Act.61  Because a customer’s ZIP code identifies the 
area in which he or she lives, in the court’s view, it plainly 
satisfies Song-Beverly’s standard as “information concerning the 
cardholder.”62  In support of its decision, the court located in 
 
57 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(b) (West 2018). Song-Beverly was enacted in 1971 
and amended in 1991, 1995, 2004, 2005, and 2011, but never to set forth a modern 
conceptualization of what counts as “personal identification information.” CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1747.08 (West 2018). 
58 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-669a(b) (West 2018). Kansas’s statute was enacted in 
1992, more than twenty-five years ago. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-669a (West 2018). 
59 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(b) (West 2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-669a(b) (West 
2018). 
60 See, e.g., Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 246 P.3d 612, 620 (Cal. 
2011) (holding that a consumer’s ZIP code constitutes “personal identification 
information” under the Song-Beverly Act). The California Supreme Court’s decision 
in Pineda contradicted the decision in Party City Corp. v. Superior Court, where the 
California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District had held that ZIP codes fell 
beyond the scope of “personal identification information” under Song-Beverly. Party 
City Corp. v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 721, 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); see also 
Florez v. Linens ‘N Things, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 465, 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) 
(holding that the Song-Beverly Act prohibits requests for personal identification 
information before the credit card transaction has ended, even if the consumer 
understood that providing her information was not required and proceeded to 
provide it voluntarily). 
61 Pineda, 246 P.3d at 616. 
62 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(b) (West 2018) (emphasis added); Pineda, 246 P.3d 
at 616. The court considered “immaterial” the fact “that such information might also 
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Song-Beverly’s legislative history an intent “to provide robust 
consumer protections” by preventing commercial entities from 
requesting and recording personal identification information not 
required to complete the credit card transaction.63 
The timing of a retail store’s request for personal 
identification information has also proven relevant under 
California case law for purposes of determining liability under 
Song-Beverly.  In Harrold v. Levi Strauss & Co., the California 
Court of Appeal for the First District found that Levi Strauss & 
Co.’s practice of requesting a customer’s email address after the 
conclusion of the credit card transaction did not run afoul of the 
Song-Beverly Act.64  The court explained that a reasonable 
consumer would consider the transaction complete after having 
been handed the purchased merchandise and a receipt, at which 
point a request for personal identification information could not 
reasonably be interpreted as a condition to accepting the credit 
card as payment.65  From the court’s perspective, Song-Beverly 
was designed to prevent retailers from collecting personal 
identification information “under the mistaken impression the 
information is required to process a credit card transaction.”66  
The act does not prohibit retailers from collecting personal 
identification information from consumers who provide it 
voluntarily and understand that it is not required.67 
Similarly broad understandings of personal identification 
information can be found in the statutes at play in 
Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, and Wisconsin, which define it as information that 
includes, but is not limited to, a customer’s address or telephone 
number.68  In Massachusetts, as in California, judicial direction 
has been needed to help define the scope of the term.  In Tyler v. 
Michaels Stores, Inc., the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
 
pertain to individuals other than the cardholder.” Pineda, 246 P.3d at 617 (emphasis 
in original). 
63 Pineda, 246 P.3d at 620. 
64 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 347, 353 (2015). Levi Strauss & Co. assumed for the 
purposes of this appeal that an email address counted as “personal identification 
information” under Song-Beverly. Id. at 349. 
65 Harrold, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 350. 
66 Id. at 351 (emphasis added). 
67 Id. 
68 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 105(a) (West 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:11-
17 (West 2018); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 520-a(3) (McKinney 2018); 69 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2602(a) (West 2018); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-13-16(a) (West 
2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 423.401(1) (West 2018). 
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held that ZIP codes fell within the statutory definition of 
“personal identification information,” reasoning that together 
with the customer’s name and other public data, ZIP codes can 
provide a business with the tools to determine the customer’s 
address or telephone number, both of which are explicitly listed 
in the statute as examples of personal identification 
information.69  The court found support for this reading in the 
statute’s primary legislative goal: “to guard consumer privacy in 
credit card transactions.”70 
B. Restrictive Definitions of Personal Identification Information 
Other jurisdictions have more narrowly limited their 
understandings of personal identification information.  In 
Maryland and the District of Columbia for example, point-of-sale 
data collection statutes apply only to a customer’s address or 
telephone number.71  Arguably less ambiguous than their more 
expansive counterparts, this definition nonetheless has called for 
judicial analysis in the District of Columbia. 
In Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia held that a ZIP code 
alone is not an “address” within the meaning of the statute.72  
The court also noted that retailer Urban Outfitters, Inc., by 
recording ZIP codes in its point-of-sale register systems, did not 
record that information “on [a] credit card transaction form” in 
violation of the statute.73  On appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit 
explained that the district court had missed the mark in failing 
to address whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue and instead 
“[dove] into the merits of [the] case.”74  Moreover, the court 
concluded that under Supreme Court jurisprudence, the 
plaintiffs did not in fact have standing, for they had failed to 
allege “any cognizable injury” resulting from disclosure of their 
 
69 Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 984 N.E.2d 737, 743–44 (2013). 
70 Id. at 742. 
71 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-317(a) (West 2018); D.C. Code Ann. 
§ 47-3153(a) (West 2018). 
72 32 F. Supp. 3d 26, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated and remanded for lack of 
standing, 830 F.3d 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[A] ZIP code cannot be considered the 
‘address’ of the ‘cardholder’ since a ZIP code, at best, merely indicates an area in 
which multiple addresses may be located.”). 
73 Hancock, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 33, vacated and remanded for lack of standing, 
830 F.3d 511. 
74 Hancock, 830 F.3d at 513. 
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ZIP codes.75  The court made reference to the basic principle that 
legislative drafting “cannot erase” the standing requirements of 
Article III of the United States Constitution by affording 
plaintiffs a statutory right to sue in circumstances under which 
they “would not otherwise have standing.”76  Accordingly, the 
precise meaning of “address” (and of “telephone number”) in the 
District of Columbia remains somewhat open to interpretation. 
III. A CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY STANDARD IS NEEDED  
AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
A. Inconsistent Regulation in this Sphere Is Especially Costly 
1. Point-of-Sale Systems 
Most retailers use a point-of-sale system tailored to their 
individual business needs, including what is essentially a 
personal computer at each point-of-sale location, linked with a 
server in the back office of that location, all operated centrally 
from the company’s headquarters.77  Businesses under common 
management generally incorporate the same point-of-sale 
systems in all their locations.78  Point-of-sale systems in retail 
settings all work in substantially the same way, but their 
operating databases differ.79  The most commonly used databases 
in the United States are provided by Microsoft and Oracle, but 
other options include systems provided by Linux and Apple.80  
Additional market complexities are attributable to preferences 
for different system features, such as operator language, from 
one retail establishment to the next.81 
Modifications to point-of-sale systems and all their 
components are generally time-consuming, expensive, and 
 
75 Id. at 514 (“The complaint here does not get out of the starting gate.”). 
76 Id. (quoting Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
77 See Alexander Polyakov, The Vulnerabilities of a POS System, FORBES (Sept. 
17, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/09/27/the-
vulnerabilities-of-a-pos-system/#619f2694b581. 
78 See Richard T. Ainsworth, Sales Suppression: The International Dimension, 
65 AM. U. L. REV. 1241, 1262 (2016). 
79 See id. at 1242 & n.7 (citing DB-Engines Ranking, DB-ENGINES, https://db-
engines.com/en/ranking (last visited May 17, 2016) (“[R]anking some 264 different 
database management systems or database engines that help run POS 
technology.”)). 
80 See id. at 1243–44. 
81 See id. at 1244. 
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disruptive to businesses.82  These changes may be necessary, 
however, when one state’s point-of-sale data collection law 
changes or is interpreted by a court in that state as having a new 
or different meaning.  Accordingly, the regulatory regime for 
point-of-sale data collection practices that the United States as a 
nation has accepted—one that continues to take a unique path in 
each state—is no longer workable. 
2. Employee Training 
State-specific standards also render necessary more 
comprehensive employee training programs, to include versions 
specially tailored for each jurisdiction in which a unique set of 
rules governs.  And because these regulations continue to remain 
open to judicial interpretation, the point-of-sale data collection 
policies of commercial entities must be subject to continual 
reevaluation, modification, and reimplementation, as needed.  
These considerations demand substantially more time and 
expense from an employee training perspective than would a 
regime in which a single, standardized set of rules applied across 
all jurisdictions. 
Moreover, time spent by the typical United States worker 
with a single employer is on the decline: “[t]he median number of 
years that wage and salary workers had been with their current 
employer was 4.2 years in January 2016, down from 4.6 years in 
January 2014.”83  In the private sector, the median tenure of 
employees was less than half that of public-sector employees.84  
Employees in service occupations “had the lowest median tenure 
(2.9 years),”85 and employees in sales and related occupations 
 
82 See, e.g., TA Operating LLC v. Comdata, Inc., No. 12954-CB, 2017 WL 
3981138, at *11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 2017) (describing how the party switching its 
point-of-sale system anticipated a timeline of “approximately two years, but it 
ultimately took three years and four months . . . for the [new] system to be fully 
deployed.”); see also e2Interactive, Inc. v. Blackhawk Network, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 190240, at *24 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 17, 2012) (noting that workaround platforms 
often are selected by smaller businesses that decide they cannot bear the costs of 
“modify[ing] their point-of-sale (POS) systems”); Burger King Corp. v. Cabrera, No. 
10-20480-Civ., 2010 WL 5834869, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2010), report and 
recommendation adopted, No. 10-20480-Civ., 2011 WL 677374 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 
2011) (deciding a dispute over whether franchisee’s refusal to replace point-of-sale 
system gave rise to proper and lawful termination by franchisor of franchisee’s 
franchise agreements). 
83 News Release, Employee Tenure in 2016, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., 1 (Sept. 22, 
2016), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/tenure_09222016.pdf. 
84 See id. at 2. 
85 Id. 
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were not much higher, with a median tenure of only 3.1 years.86  
These factors necessitate further padding of the already sizable 
employee training budgets set by retailers in the United States,87 
to ensure that their increasingly temporary labor force remain 
thoroughly educated about point-of-sale data collection laws and 
how to comply with them.  Instead, a standardized federal regime 
would eliminate the need for such nuanced, state-specific 
training policies and procedures. 
B. Existing State Statutes Are Obsolete 
The above-described state statutes that govern data 
collection at the point of sale all were enacted at least 
twenty-four years ago.  A handful of them were amended more 
recently, but not to address the problems stemming from 
continued reliance on provisions whose legislative purposes could 
not have contemplated modern retail practices or contemporary 
forms of personal identification information.88  As a result, courts 
are left to divine how the lawmakers of yesteryear would have 
intended these statutes to apply today.89  Retail entities are left 
to formulate compliant business practices in the face of 
ambiguous regulation,90 and consumers must live with 
inconsistent protection of their personal data. 
As discussed above, “retrofitting statutes piecemeal” can 
produce undesirable outcomes, for example, by generating mixed 
judicial understandings of statutory terms like “address.”91  By 
way of illustration, whereas the California Supreme Court and 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court both found that a 
customer’s ZIP code counted as an “address” and thus qualified 
as “personal identification information,”92 the District Court for 
the District of Columbia viewed a ZIP code as a mere fragment of 
 
86 Id. at tbl.6. 
87 In 2016, large companies budgeted an average of $14.3 million each to 
employee training, midsize companies an average of $1.4 million each, and small 
companies an average of $376,251 each. 2016 Training Industry Report, 
TRAININGMAG, 32 (2016), https://trainingmag.com/sites/default/files/images/Training 
_Industry_Report_2016.pdf. 
88 See Lally & Valerio Barrad, supra note 20 (“[T]he Song-Beverly Credit Card 
Act predates the advent of modern electronic payments, online transactions, 
downloadable products and the Internet . . . .”). 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 Id. 
92 Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 246 P.3d 612, 618 (Cal. 2011); Tyler 
v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 984 N.E.2d 737, 743 (2013). 
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an address, which therefore did not rise to the level of “personal 
identification information.”93  Such deviations from one 
jurisdiction to the next, and continued dependence on rules ever 
subject to judicial transformation, are burdensome realities for 
commercial entities seeking to maintain shrewd business 
practices without discounting the privacy rights of their 
customers. 
Moreover, in those few jurisdictions in which courts have 
applied existing, outmoded statutes to contemporary retail 
practices (namely, California, Massachusetts, and the District of 
Columbia), the courts’ rationales have relied in part on generic 
principles of statutory interpretation in the face of textual 
uncertainty.94  As Columbia Law Professor Karl Llewellyn first 
pointed out, canons of statutory construction “readily can be used 
to cancel each other out,” giving rise to doubts about their 
purported objectivity and value as “tools to constrain judges.”95  
The findings of one study reveal that even at the United States 
Supreme Court level, canons of statutory construction do not 
appear to impact “the Justices’ tendency to vote consistently with 
their ideological preferences, at least in divided-vote cases.”96  
Another study shows that many canons simply are ignored 
altogether by lawmakers during the statutory drafting process.97  
Thus, while employing traditional principles of statutory 
interpretation can seem like a useful exercise, the results may 
turn out to be a sharper reflection of judicial philosophy than of 
legislative intent. 
 
93 See Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 3d 26, 32 (2014), vacated 
and remanded for lack of standing, Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 830 F.3d 511 
(2016); see also Lally & Valerio Barrad, supra note 20. 
94 See, e.g., Pineda., 246 P.3d at 616 (looking to the words of the statute as the 
most reliable indicator of statutory intent); see also id. (“[W]e do not construe 
statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute ‘with reference to the entire 
scheme of law of which it is part’ so that the whole may be harmonized and retain 
effectiveness.”); id. (resorting to the dictionary definition of the statutory term 
“concerning” as guidance for determining legislative intent); Tyler v. Michaels 
Stores, Inc., 984 N.E.2d 737, 740–41 (2013) (relying on the title of the statute in 
question as “useful guidance” for determining legislative intent). 
95 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules 
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 
(1950); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 912 (2016). 
96 Krishnakumar, supra note 95, at 914. 
97 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from 
the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the 
Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 907 (2013). 
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Fresh statutory drafting in the point-of-sale data collection 
sphere certainly would produce rules more attuned to modern 
retail practices than those enacted decades ago.  In addition, 
drafting practices today might simply be better than they were in 
the past.  As some commentators have observed, notable 
improvements in legislative procedures since the birth of 
Song-Beverly and its counterparts have “fundamentally altered” 
how Congress creates laws98 and have resulted in the creation of 
legislation that is “more precise and detailed” than ever before.99  
The overall lawmaking process has been thoroughly revamped 
and modernized.  Custom-made legislative software, for example, 
now equips drafters with bill templates and automatic formatting 
features to help maintain stylistic uniformity across 
documents.100  In addition, the staff makeup of congressional 
committees has become highly specialized, such that committee 
members, who in the past would have worked on bills across a 
range of legal topics, now dedicate themselves to a single, specific 
pocket of the law.101  These advances in the legislative process 
can hardly be neglected in the point-of-sale data collection space, 
where the existing laws are so critically in need of reinvention.102 
Even assuming the state statutes currently in effect, as 
supplemented by any necessary judicial interpretation, do indeed 
approximate their would-be contemporary objectives, there are 
boundaries to tasking the judiciary with the regulation of 
consumer data privacy.103  If courts were responsible for weighing 
fact-specific privacy interests “against the benefits of free data 
flows”—an intricate policy determination better left to the 
legislature—the resolution of information privacy questions 
would require abundant time and resources.104  And because the 
 
98 Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of 
Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 816 (2014) (noting how the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1970 “paved the way for the modernization of legislative 
drafting”). 
99 See id. at 813 (“Today, statutes are thoroughly researched and written by 
large groups of experts who are more aware of what courts and agencies are doing 
than ever before . . . .”). 
100 See id. at 821. 
101 See id. at 845. 
102 To simply amend existing statutes after courts have opined on their meaning 
in new contexts would fail to provide sufficient direction to courts, consumers, and 
retailers as novel questions continue to arise. See Lally & Valerio Barrad, supra note 
20. Accordingly, a federal statutory approach is the most sensible solution. 
103 See Shaffer, supra note 5, at 37. 
104 Id. 
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situations in which those questions could arise are “virtually 
infinite,” judges simply would not be able to manage them all.105  
The data privacy field is also uniquely challenging due to the 
“informational asymmetry” that exists between consumers and 
the entities that collect their personal data, as well as the 
“behavioral tendencies [of consumers] to underestimate long-
term risk.”106  These realities can cause laypersons to formulate 
incorrect beliefs and further reinforce this Note’s proposal that 
these important decisions be entrusted to a well-informed 
legislature. 
C. Counterargument: The States as Laboratories 
As Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis famously 
observed in a 1932 dissenting opinion, the states bear a solemn 
duty to test out the answers to emerging social or economic 
questions, and stifling a state’s exploratory spirit “may be 
fraught with serious consequences to the nation.”107  A major 
benefit of our federal system is that it allows for “a single 
courageous state” to act as a laboratory and to engage in valuable 
trial and error “without risk to the rest of the country.”108  The 
judicial branch may at times decide to terminate that process,109 
but as Justice Brandeis cautioned, it must do so prudently, “lest 
[the courts] erect [their] prejudices into legal principles.”110 
In the information privacy law universe, commentators have 
acknowledged the states’ particularly meaningful role as 
laboratories.111  States have, for example, “been the first to 
identify areas of regulatory significance and to take action,”112 
responded to difficult questions with “innovative approaches,”113 
 
105 Id. 
106 Nicole A. Ozer, Putting Online Privacy Above the Fold: Building a Social 
Movement and Creating Corporate Change, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 
220 (2012). 
107 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
108 Id.; see also Thomas W. Hazlett, Is Federal Preemption Efficient in Cellular 
Phone Regulation?, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 155, 172 (“The United States is perceived as 
a federalist experiment due to its relatively heavy use of overlapping jurisdictions, 
from mosquito abatement districts to the U.S. Government.”). 
109 New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[The Court] 
may strike down the statute which embodies [an experiment] on the ground that, in 
[the Court’s] opinion, the measure is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.”). 
110 Id. 
111 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 7, at 916. 
112 Id. at 917. 
113 Id. 
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and made possible “simultaneous experiment[ation] with 
different policies.”114  But the ultimate goal of state 
experimentation is to utilize the findings gathered to pinpoint 
the most effective, workable solution to a problem.  With respect 
to Song-Beverly and its equivalents, the states have had an 
opportunity to experiment—one that now has spanned several 
decades—and the time has come for analysis of the findings 
gathered and “coherent policy implementation of the knowledge 
gained.”115 
There are, of course, circumstances under which 
individualized, state-by-state regulation is more appropriate 
than a nationwide rule—namely, when the regulated conduct is 
territorially confined and there are few “market spillovers.”116  In 
those cases, the benefits of locally tailored approaches might well 
outweigh the costs of forgoing or disturbing economies of scale.117  
On the other hand, federal standardization makes more sense 
when an approach that has generated efficiencies in one 
jurisdiction is likely to do so in others, rendering 
“[b]alkanization” unnecessary, wasteful, and bad for 
consumers.118  When diverse, state-specific rules govern conduct 
that is substantially the same across the country, local legislative 
and regulatory bodies look to maximize the benefits to their own 
constituents, where possible, by “shifting costs” to other 
jurisdictions.119  Moreover, even if one jurisdiction deems 
stringent regulation of a particular activity unjustifiably costly, 
and therefore forgoes it, national businesses nonetheless often 
decide to comply with the rules of the most restrictive states, 
imposing on all states, and on all consumers, their costs of doing 
so.120  By contrast, consumers enjoy both direct and indirect 
advantages when regulations are consistent nationwide.121  They 
 
114 Id. at 918. 
115 Id. at 932. 
116 Hazlett, supra note 108, at 156. 
117 Id. at 175. State-specific rules are generally more suitable “when local 
markets are relatively idiosyncratic, when the benefits of diverse rules are large 
relative to the costs of non-uniformity, [and] when the rules adopted in one state are 
largely contained within that jurisdiction.” Id. 
118 Id. at 177 n.74. 
119 Id. at 180. “[I]f decentralization would lead to . . . inequitable outcomes 
across states, these services should be provided by the national government.” Id. at 
179. 
120 Id. at 181. “[F]irms adjust to diverse regulations by conforming to those rules 
that allow for the best aggregate operations.” Id. at 182. 
121 Id. at 184. 
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benefit directly from “reduc[ed] information costs,” as the rules 
they may choose to educate themselves about remain constant in 
all settings, and they benefit indirectly from commercial 
efficiencies that result in lower prices.122 
Under that analysis, in the point-of-sale data collection 
space, a federal regulatory regime is most sensible.123  The 
conduct being regulated is substantially the same nationwide, 
and across all retailers, because it revolves around one basic 
commercial goal: to leverage the ever-escalating value of personal 
identification information.124  Whether used to formulate 
personalized advertisements based on the specific interests of 
consumers, or to provide information about consumer purchasing 
behaviors, the “commodification” of personal identification 
information is a growing trend in the United States,125 and 
businesses are certain to continue experimenting with new ways 
of obtaining it.  This Note proposes that uniformity in the 
regulation of its collection at the point of sale will boost actual 
compliance and generate commercial efficiencies, resulting in 
more consistent protection of data privacy126 and benefitting 
consumers in the form of lower prices. 
Moreover, in an increasingly mobile world, where residents 
of one state frequently travel to and make purchases in various 
other states, it is far more practical to establish a single set of 
rules that applies across all fifty states.  This truth seemingly 
has been realized in the privacy regulations of other countries, 
for example, in Canada and the European Union,127  where 
 
122 Id. Uniformity in food labeling regulation, as an example, led to greater 
“consumer awareness of the ingredients in food.” Id. 
123 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 7, at 904 (“A patchwork of information privacy 
laws now exists in the United States, and it is one with federal and state elements. 
In the view of [Bill] Gates and many others, it would be preferable to create a single 
federal law for the private sector that would impose uniform standards.”). 
124 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 4, at 2056–57 (“The monetary value of 
personal data is large and still growing, and corporate America is moving quickly to 
profit from this trend. Companies view this information as a corporate asset and 
have invested heavily in software that facilitates the collection of consumer 
information.”). 
125 Id. 
126 “[P]olling data reveal that Americans are extremely concerned about privacy, 
both on and off the Internet.” Schwartz & Solove, supra note 13, at 1815. 
127 The member countries of the European Union include: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom. European Union: EU member countries in brief, EUROPA, 
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consumers enjoy “broad-based” protections of their privacy and 
personal information.128  By contrast, direct marketing in the 
United States is not stringently regulated129—and not by any 
sweeping federal laws.  While proponents of continued reliance 
on “market mechanisms” to protect consumer data privacy130 
argue that efficiencies in private activity are most readily 
achieved “when government regulation does not constrain 
entrepreneurial activity,”131 this Note’s proposed federal 
regulatory scheme for the point-of-sale data collection realm will 
nonetheless facilitate greater efficiencies than are possible under 
the existing framework of conflicting state laws. 
IV. THE FEDERAL SOLUTION 
A. Both a Ceiling and a Floor 
Federal regulatory schemes can set a “floor”—“a minimum 
standard that states may exceed”132—or a “ceiling,” which 
“preempt[s] state legislation with the effect of weakening existing 
state standards,” as it does not permit more stringent state 
regulation above and beyond the federal rule.133  In order to 
realize the above-described efficiencies, consumer returns, and 
other benefits, uniformity is key, and thus both a floor and a 
ceiling are necessary.134  Business leaders in the United States 
 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries_en (last 
visited May 16, 2019). For now, the United Kingdom remains a full member of the 
European Union, but that may change as a result of Brexit. Id. 
128 King, supra note 12, at 238. 
129 Id. Several commentators argue that “the appropriate architecture” for 
digital privacy protection in the United States in “the information age” is one in 
which a federal actor oversees the compilation and use of personal data. Richards, 
supra note 8, at 1092. 
130 Shaffer, supra note 5, at 27 (“Because of the government’s ad hoc approach to 
data privacy, U.S. regulation of the private sector largely depends on industry norms 
and individual company policies that are developed in reaction to market 
pressures.”). 
131 Id. 
132 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 919–20 (referencing the Video Privacy Protection 
Act of 1988, the Wiretap Act, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). 
133 Id. at 920–21. The “meritorious aspects” of one federal law—FACTA—were 
realized through restricting the extent to which the states could decide to allow for 
more stringent consumer privacy protection in their own laws. Id. at 921. 
134 Having recognized that some states may have opted not to regulate in this 
space because privacy in personal identification information matters less to their 
citizens, this Note’s proposed federal standard would be imposed on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis, such that each state would need to either adopt it or refrain from 
regulating. Such an approach aims to respect the decisions of those states whose 
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have also weighed in to declare ceiling preemption imperative to 
their backing of and cooperation with “any comprehensive 
legislation” in this area.135 
B. The Definition of “Personal Identification Information” 
Because it is “[t]he fact that certain information is personal” 
that triggers consumer rights in this area,136  the parameters of 
information privacy law, in general, and of point-of-sale data 
collection law, in particular, necessarily are determined by the 
“currently unstable category” of personal identification 
information.137  In light of this reality, it is difficult to understand 
how United States privacy law has not yet delineated a standard 
meaning for this term.138  The need for one nevertheless remains 
exigent. 
In the point-of-sale data collection sphere, a handful of 
existing state statutes indicate vague understandings of personal 
identification information as data “concerning” the customer,139 
and others simply provide non-exhaustive lists of what might 
qualify as personal identification information, like a customer’s 
address or telephone number.140  In other words, though assorted 
meanings have been ascribed to the term, “little thought” has 
been dedicated to why one makes more sense than others.141 
This Note proposes doing away with a fixed definition of the 
types of data that are and are not within the scope of personal 
identification information, in favor of a more dynamic 
conceptualization of the term—one that accounts for the fact that 
technology “is constantly evolving,” and that “depends upon 
changing technological developments.”142  Because the 
 
citizens do not desire point-of-sale data collection regulations without sacrificing the 
benefits of maintaining uniformity across states whose citizens do wish to protect 
their privacy in these items. 
135 See, e.g., Microsoft’s Bill Gates Wants New Privacy Law, CIO (Mar. 8, 2007, 
7:00 AM), https://www.cio.com/article/2441839/security-privacy/microsoft-s-bill-
gates-wants-new-privacy-law.html; see also Elena Schneider, Technology Companies 
Are Pressing Congress to Bolster Privacy Protections, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/27/us/technology-firms-press-congress-to-tighten-
privacy-law.html;  Schwartz, supra note 7, at 921–22. 
136 Gratton, supra note 11, at 110. 
137 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 13, at 1816. 
138 Id. 
139 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1747.08(b) (West 2018). 
140 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 105(a) (West 2018). 
141 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 13, at 1827. 
142 Id.  at 1818. 
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overwhelming goal of data collection at the point of sale is to 
forge new avenues of communication with consumers, the 
regulation addressing that conduct must set forth a definition of 
“personal identification information” that includes whichever 
mailboxes, physical or virtual, now known or later invented, at 
which a consumer might receive commercial marketing 
messaging.  Such an approach allows for the inclusion of data 
like an individual’s home address, telephone number, email 
address, Facebook username, Twitter handle, and Instagram 
account, all of which can be conceived of as, or serve as a 
pathway to, a consumer mailbox subject to potential targeting by 
advertisers.  While articulating examples of these mailboxes is 
instructive, the broader definition remains “flexible and 
evolving,” yet retains “coherent boundaries,”143 such that the 
resulting body of data within the scope of the law is neither 
under- nor over-inclusive.144 
C. Transaction Types Covered 
The existing state statutes are limited, for the most part, to 
credit card transactions,145 reflecting one of the legislative goals 
of their enactment—to minimize the risk of credit card  
fraud—but rather deserting the other goal of protecting 
consumer privacy.  This Note proposes a rule that applies to all 
transactions at the point of sale, regardless of payment method, 
such that retailers are foreclosed from circumventing the spirit of 
the law by requesting and recording consumer mailbox 
information during transactions not covered by the regulation. 
D. Mandatory Conduct 
1. Informed Consent 
Under this Note’s proposed federal framework, merchants 
may record a customer’s mailbox information only after 
informing the customer what it will be used for and notifying the 
 
143 Id.  at 1827. 
144 See Gratton, supra note 11, at 113. In future contexts, the mailbox approach 
will likely still require some level of statutory interpretation. Having identified the 
challenges associated with judicial resolution of information privacy questions, this 
Note proposes delegation of that task to an administrative agency, such as the 
Federal Trade Commission, that is better equipped to manage it than is the judicial 
system. 
145 Some state statutes also apply to check payment transactions. 
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customer that providing it is voluntary and not required to 
complete the transaction.146  The merchant must provide these 
notices in the same format—verbally or in writing—in which the 
request for the customer’s mailbox information is made.  The 
delivery of these notices must be sufficiently “clear and 
conspicuous” that a reasonable consumer would have an 
opportunity to absorb and understand them, free from 
unnecessary, distracting language.147  Thus, whatever the 
merchant’s objective in collecting a customer’s mailbox 
information, it must be properly disclosed, allowing the customer 
to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of sharing that data 
and make an informed decision about whether to do so. 
2. Employee Training 
Under this proposed federal regime, merchants must 
establish company policies and procedures to ensure that any 
collected information is used only for those purposes for which 
the customer provided consent at the time of collection.  The 
store associates directly involved in the compilation of consumer 
mailbox data must also be trained, initially and periodically 
throughout their employment, in accordance with those 
policies.148 
CONCLUSION 
Existing state laws in the United States that govern how 
businesses collect and record the personal identification 
information of consumers are relics from a time during which 
 
146 This architecture displaces the need to address the reality that “it is now 
possible to interpret almost any data as personal information.” Gratton, supra note 
11, at 113. Although sophisticated entities easily can “extrapolate a particular 
identity from a few scraps of online data,” a merchant would be in violation of the 
proposed federal regulation if it used such an “extrapolated” identity without first 
having secured that customer’s informed consent. Bartholomew, supra note 16, at 
747. 
147 Lesley Fair, Full Disclosure, FTC (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/blogs/business-blog/2014/09/full-disclosure. The Federal Trade Commission’s 
guidance on how to make effective disclosures—for example, by observing “[t]he 4Ps” 
(Prominence, Presentation, Placement, and Proximity)—would prove helpful in 
determining how to analyze whether a merchant’s notice to a customer before 
collecting his mailbox information was sufficiently clear and conspicuous. Id. 
148 A business’s good faith implementation of compliant policies and proper 
training of employees would serve as a safe harbor under this Note’s proposed 
federal framework, such that one-off employee errors or single instances of non-
compliance would not subject the business to potential liability. 
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lawmakers could not possibly have contemplated their 
application in modern retail settings.  They also vary in 
important respects, for example, in their conceptualizations of 
what constitutes “personal identification information” and what 
activates consumer safeguards.  These inconsistencies generate 
commercial inefficiencies, which harm consumers indirectly in 
the form of higher prices.  Consumers also suffer more direct 
negative consequences as their data privacy remains subject to 
variable, impermanent protection across the country.  
Accordingly, a federal solution, with a design  that contemplates 
modern retail goals and does away with unnecessary, ambiguous 
concepts, is needed to preempt and standardize the varying state 
regulations of these business activities. 
 
